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SUMMARY
Since the dissolution of the Rural Cooperative Medical System at the end of the commune period, illness has emerged
as a leading cause of poverty in rural China. To address the poor state of health care, the Chinese government
unveiled the New Cooperative Medical System in 2002. Because local governments have been given significant control
over program design, fundamental characteristics of the program vary from one county to the next. These differences
may influence the decision to seek health care as well as the choice of hospital conditional on that initial decision. In
this paper, we use a nested logit model to analyze household survey data from 25 counties to analyze the determinants
of such health-seeking behavior. We find that age, the share of household expenditures allocated to food consumption
(a measure of relative income), and the presence of other sick people in the household negatively affect the decision to
seek health care while disability has a positive influence. Further, conditional on seeking treatment, the reimbursement
scheme in place in each county and the average daily expenditure associated with hospitalization strongly influence
hospital choice. Copyright r 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Poor households in developing countries are less able to afford health care and are often serviced with
lower quality care than the nonpoor (World Bank, 1993). As a result, the poor are less likely to seek
necessary treatment (e.g. Makinen et al., 2000). At the same time, health shocks and poor health care
are correlated with increases in poverty (e.g. Smith, 1999; Wagstaff, 2007) as those who seek care may
incur medical debt while those who forego care lose productivity. China follows these trends. For
example, 38% of rural people who were sick in 2003 did not seek treatment (Hsiao, 2005), and 22% of
poor households in 1998 identified illness or injury as the cause of their poverty (Ministry of Health,
1999). Similarly, Gustafsson and Li (2003) find that high health care expenses caused 2.5% more
households to drop below the poverty line in 1995.
The widespread lack of insurance in rural China is an important factor underlying these outcomes
(Hsiao, 1995; Lindelow and Wagstaff, 2005). In particular, China’s highly successful Rural Cooperative
Medical System (RCMS) collapsed alongside communal farming in the early 1980s, leaving most
farmers vulnerable. To address illness-led poverty and the poor state of health care in rural China more
generally, the central government introduced a new insurance scheme in 2002. The New Cooperative
Medical System (NCMS) is a voluntary program that protects participants against major illnesses by
partially reimbursing health care expenditures. Although it is heavily subsidized by central, provincial,
and sub-provincial governments, the program is administered at the county level, and local
administrators have flexibility in its design and management. Consequently, there is heterogeneity in
implementation, which may influence the decision to seek health care and where to seek it.
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The goal of this paper is to analyze how both variations in the design of the NCMS and household/
individual characteristics of sick participants influence health-seeking behavior and hospital choice
conditional on that decision. Previous research on whether health insurance affects the decision to seek
treatment yields surprisingly mixed evidence. For example, people who held compulsory insurance in
Vietnam are three times more likely to receive inpatient medical care than the uninsured, but admission
rates of beneficiaries under a voluntary plan are similar to those of uninsured people (Sepehri et al., 2006).
The nature of health insurance also impacts utilization. For example, Yip et al. (2008) show that lower
deductibles and immediate reimbursements result in higher use of outpatient care but do not impact
inpatient care in rural China. Evidence is also mixed on how individuals who seek health care choose
specific hospitals for treatment. For example, Adams et al. (1991) find that distance is a deterrent in the
hospital choice of elderly Americans while Varkevisser and van der Geest (2007) find that Dutch patients
prefer larger hospitals regardless of location. Next, while Adams et al. (1991) also observe that patients
with severe illnesses prefer treatment in regional hospitals, Morey et al. (2003) find that the household
income and treatment cost have stronger effects on hospital choice than the severity of illness or hospital
quality in Nepal. They further find that sensitivity to costs and income is lower for men than women.
In this paper, we examine how variation in the design of county policies influence the choice of
hospital by households. We further examine how these decisions differ among the poor and elderly, two
vulnerable groups. Inasmuch as the quality of care varies by hospital type, the interaction between such
NCMS policies on treatment decisions of enrollees can cause variation in actual health outcomes.
Following recent practice in the literature, we employ a full information maximum likelihood nested
logit model with random utility maximization. We find that age, the share of household expenditures
allocated to food consumption (a measure of relative income), and the presence of other sick people in
the household negatively influence the decision to seek health care while disability has a positive impact.
Moreover, conditional on treatment, the specific design of the NCMS program influences the hospital
choice. In particular, as the reimbursement ceiling rises, households with more elderly members
increasingly choose hospitals at higher administrative levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the objectives and structure of
the NCMS program; Section 3 describes the data and provides summary statistics; Section 4 outlines the
multinomial nested logit model; Section 5 provides results; and Section 6 discusses these results.
2. THE NCMS PROGRAM AND HEALTH CARE IN CHINA
Rural health insurance was an integral part of the collective farming system in China, yet after the
dissolution of communal farming, budget constraints forced many localities to abandon their insurance
programs (Hsiao, 1984; Liu, 2004). Thus, 96% of rural households lacked health insurance by 2002 and
38% of the sick forwent necessary medical attention (Hsiao, 2005).
Rural health care returned to the national agenda with the introduction of the NCMS in 2002 (State
Council, 2002). The NCMS has several important features that distinguish it from the previous
programs. First, the NCMS operates on a voluntary basis. As such, the prospect for adverse selection is
high. To address this concern, the central government has conditioned matching funding on local
governments achieving 80% enrollment. Local governments have responded by visiting households to
encourage enrollment by requiring whole households to enroll together, and/or by requiring that
emigrants enroll with other household members despite sometimes being ineligible for NCMS
reimbursement.1
1Hesketh et al. (2008) demonstrate that migrants have better self-reported health status and lower incidence of acute illness,
chronic disease, and disability, even controlling for age and education, suggesting that they may be less likely to use the program
as well.
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Second, although central and local governments underwrite the program, individuals pay
participation fees. Each county sets its own fee, and some offer assistance or waive the fee for poor
households (Wang and Rosenman, 2007). The central government has stipulated a minimum fee of 10
RMB per person, although many counties charge more. Participation fees are matched by at least 20
RMB from regional and/or sub-regional governments in poor counties, although the central
government has mandated a 40 RMB match in wealthy areas. In addition, fees in poorer provinces
are matched by an additional 20 RMB from the central government.2 Total funding available for each
participant averages 52 RMB (Nie, 2007).
Third, many aspects of the design, implementation, and management of the NCMS program are
determined locally. Because the total pooled funds cover only 20–30% of per-capita medical spending
(World Health Organization, 2004), county administrators face the challenge of reimbursing medical
expenditures without exhausting their funding; with little direction from the state, individual counties
have experimented with reimbursement systems. That is, each county decides reimbursement rates,
whether to restrict coverage to specific ailments, and whether or not to limit eligibility to certain clinics
and hospitals.3 In practice, reimbursement rates vary by total expenditure, and many NCMS programs
stipulate that a spending threshold be met before expenses become eligible for reimbursement. Ceilings
on total reimbursement are also widespread. In addition, reimbursement rates often vary according to
the administrative level of the hospital providing treatment.
Although participants are generally able to seek care in any hospital, many counties encourage local
spending by lowering minimum spending levels or by offering higher reimbursement rates at local
facilities (Wagstaff et al., 2009). While all NCMS programs cover inpatient medical care associated with
catastrophic illnesses, only a subset of programs cover outpatient care, even for follow-up treatment
(Wang et al., 2008). Further, while some counties cover accidents or inpatient child delivery, others do
not. Yan et al. (2006) find that just 6% of hospital expenses were reimbursed in surveyed counties in
2004, suggesting that such cost-saving measures have been successful.
The NCMS has been implemented on a county-by-county basis since early 2003. The early adopters
were not randomly chosen, but were selected based on local interest, managerial capacity, economic
development level, and the quality of local facilities (Brown et al., 2009). Participation grew 67%
between 2006 and 2007, yet participation rates within program counties have also risen. The proportion
of NCMS participants that have actually benefited from the NCMS program has also seen a dramatic
increase, doubling between 2005 and 2006 (Nie, 2007).
3. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
The data for this study come from surveys undertaken in October 2006.4 The household sample
consists of 50 households in each of 30 counties in Anhui and Jiangsu provinces in eastern China. The
household survey included modules on demographics, health, health insurance, income, and expenditures
over the previous year. A matching county-level survey was given to administrators overseeing the
NCMS.
Of the 30 surveyed counties, 26 had established NCMS programs in place. In Anhui, 16 of the
province’s 105 county-level divisions had operated NCMS programs one or more years; all of these
2Prior to 2006, matches provided by the central and local governments were generally 10 RMB per participant.
3While financial considerations drive most of these decisions, the experience and training of county-level administrators varies
widely, suggesting that some programs are likely to be better designed and more sustainable than others.
4The household-level data collection was undertaken by provincial offices of the National Bureau of Statistics in close
collaboration with the Institute for Population and Labor Economics (IPLE) at the Chinese Academy of Social Science and
Nanjing Agricultural University. The county-level survey was completed directly by researchers at IPLE. Data collection efforts
were supported by the Ford Foundation Beijing Program Office.
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counties are included in our sample. All rural county-level districts in Jiangsu had implemented NCMS
programs, so the ten counties in Jiangsu are drawn from a random sample stratified by income. One
county in Jiangsu provided incomplete data on the fee structure of the NCMS, so our effective sample
comprises 1250 households in 25 counties.5
An important limitation of our study is that we do not have a random sample of NCMS programs
across China; as such, our results are statistically representative only of NCMS counties in Anhui and
Jiangsu. Nevertheless, the issues that we raise reflect broadly on NCMS programs across China.
Brown et al. (2009) provide a detailed account of variation in the NCMS programs included in this
survey. To summarize, the participation fee chosen by counties reflects county wealth: only one county
in Anhui set the participation fee above the 10 RMB minimum established by the central government,
while only two counties in Jiangsu adopted a 10 RMB fee (Table I). Furthermore, two very wealthy
counties in Jiangsu have set fees of 30 RMB and 40 RMB, respectively. Most counties promote
participation by reducing fees for ‘five guarantee’ (wu bao) and other poor households.
Differences in program fees stem from differences in financing across the two provinces. As a wealthy
province, Jiangsu is ineligible for central government matching funds, so provincial, prefectural, county,
and township governments compensate by contributing a greater share of the budget.6 In Anhui, by
contrast, the central government is responsible for at least 24% of the budget in all 16 counties, allowing
local governments to reduce their contributions accordingly.
The budget influences decisions that each county makes regarding minimum spending levels eligible
for reimbursement, maximum reimbursements, emigrant eligibility, and other aspects of program
design.7 For example, only 56% of the sampled counties in Anhui and 20% of the sampled counties in
Jiangsu allow emigrants to participate, likely because health care costs are higher in cities that attract
migrants (Eggleston and Yip, 2004). Reimbursement regimes for health expenditures also vary
considerably, even across neighboring counties: the deductible ranges from 200 to 500 RMB in Anhui
and from 0 to 1500 RMB in Jiangsu; the benefit ceiling ranges from 3000 to 40 000 RMB in Anhui and
from 15 000 to 50 950 RMB in Jiangsu. Moreover, the administrative level of the hospital in which care
is given influences these thresholds. For example, the median level of spending eligible for
reimbursement is 200 RMB in township hospitals versus 300 RMB in other types of hospitals.
Table II shows the province-wide average daily health expenditures for inpatient care in both Anhui
and Jiangsu. The province-wide daily average expenditure in a township-level facility is 222 RMB in
Anhui versus 341 RMB in Jiangsu. The difference is more pronounced at the county level, with a daily
average expenditure of 315 RMB in Anhui and 520 RMB in Jiangsu. At the prefectural/provincial level,
however, the cost of care in Anhui is greater than that in Jiangsu, with average daily expenditures of 587
and 526 RMB, respectively.
Within the 25 counties included in our analysis, 89% of survey respondents have enrolled in the local
NCMS program. With such high enrollment rates, bias due to selection into the program is unlikely to
be problematic. Indeed, as shown in Table III, households that enroll in the program do not differ from
those who do not enroll in terms of age structure, gender of the household head, the number of
household members with disabilities or limitations in activities of daily living (ADLs), the number of
household members who emigrate for work, the number of people who described themselves as being
sick in the previous year, or income. That being said, heads of household who enroll in the program
have 0.6 fewer years of education than heads of households who do not enroll, a difference that is
significant at the 90% confidence level.
5All households were drawn from the National Bureau of Statistics sampling frame.
6In central and northern Jiangsu, where incomes and economic opportunities lag behind those found in wealthy southern
communities such as Nanjing, Suzhou, and Wuxi, the provincial government heavily subsidizes the NCMS.
7Other characteristics that vary across the sampled counties include financing schemes, reimbursement rates at each level of
hospital, coverage of non-chronic ailments, and hospital referral systems (Brown et al., 2009).
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Among the 4315 program participants in our survey, 442 (10%) either described their current health
as ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’ than one year earlier or received inpatient treatment during the previous
year.8 Because we cannot observe which individuals were sick enough to require inpatient treatment, we
use two different samples to analyze the determinants of health-seeking behavior and the choice of
NCMS hospitals conditional on seeking care. Specifically, we initially restrict the sample to 442 ‘sick’
individuals who either sought inpatient care or who can reasonably be expected to have needed it.
As doing so may bias estimates upward by including all individuals who sought care without including
individuals known to be as sick who did not seek care, we also estimate all of the models using the
sample of 366 individuals who described their current health to be ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’ than before.
Summary statistics for the 442 sick NCMS participants and the non-sick sample of 3783 NCMS
participants are presented in Table IV. The average age of sick people is 53, nearly 20 years older than
people who were not. Women comprise 55% of the sick population but only 48% of the population that
was not. The incidence of disability and/or limitations in ADLs is 13% among the sick, ten times higher
than among the non-sick. Only 4% of the sick subsample emigrated compared with 17% of the non-
sick. Household heads in the subsample with sick members have 0.8 fewer years of education, although
this may reflect age differences in the two groups. Also likely related to age, people in the sick subsample
are more likely to reside with other sick individuals. Finally, households with sick members allocate
slightly more of their budget to food (52%) than households without sick members (50%).9 Other than
food shares, all of the differences are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
4. MODEL AND IDENTIFICATION
To model health care-seeking behavior among the sick, many studies employ multinomial or conditional
logits. However, both models assume that errors are identically and independently distributed (iid) and
Table II. Average daily expenditures on inpatient care in RMB, by province




Sample size 321 132
Source: Authors’ survey data.
Table III. Summary statistics for enrolled and non-enrolled households
Enrolled households (n5 1143) Non-enrolled households (n5 91)
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Average age of members Years 36.4 0.316 36.4 1.035
Male head of household Percent 95.9 0.006 95.6 0.022
Members with disabilities or ADLs Number 0.027 0.003 0.029 0.011
Members who migrate out for work Number 0.155 0.006 0.137 0.021
Head of household’s education Years 8.03 0.092 8.60 0.37
Income log RMB 9.50 0.043 9.74 0.141
Members who were sick in the last year Number 0.11 0.006 0.08 0.015
Notes: ‘Enrolled’ is defined as having enrolled in NCMS in the previous year. , , and  indicate that the differences in means
are statistically significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels using a t-test, respectively. Source: Authors’ survey data.
8Women whose only hospitalization in the previous year was for the purpose of inpatient child delivery are not included in this figure.
9The share of household expenditures allocated to food is based on the authors’ survey data and includes home production.
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that the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition is satisfied. In the event that these
assumptions are violated, multinomial and conditional logits yield inconsistent estimates (Amemiya 1985).
The nested logit model partially relaxes these assumptions while retaining the iid assumption within
each partition, i.e. the error terms between two decisions are assumed to be uncorrelated, yet the errors
within a given category may have non-zero correlations. In our model, we are concerned both with the
decision to seek inpatient health care and, conditional on this decision, the choice of hospital. Such
decisions are best illustrated by a tree structure with each decision represented by a distinct level/nest.
The 442 individuals who participated in the NCMS program and who reported being sick comprise the
trunk of the tree (Figure 1). Two limbs stem from the trunk – seek treatment in an NCMS facility and
do not seek treatment in an NCMS facility10 – forming the first nest of the tree. Conditional on seeking
treatment, the second nest contains three branches indicating the administrative level of the hospital in
which treatment was sought (i.e. township, county, or prefectural/provincial).11 Importantly, the nested
logit model does not imply any temporal ordering of choices.
The nested logit model reflects a choice framework such that individuals consider only the choice
presenting the maximum utility for each decision. Suppose, for example, that an individual receives
greater utility from treatment outside the county than from local hospitals. When deciding between
seeking treatment and foregoing treatment, the only type of care that will influence the decision is that
sought outside the county.
Following Heiss (2002), we employ a two-level decision tree with K upper-level alternatives and H
lower-level alternatives, defining the utility function for individual i as Uih ¼ Rih þ eih, where
Rih ¼ ah þ bhxih þ ghyi. Rih, the deterministic portion of utility, is comprised of the alternative-
specific variables, xih, and the case-specific variables, yi. eih is the random portion of utility and h 2 H.




, where rk denotes the correlation within
nest k, k 2 K . In the event that lk ¼ 0, the choices comprised in nest k are perfectly correlated. If,
instead, lk ¼ 1, the alternatives are independent, i.e. the model reduces to a multinomial logit.
For the kth level of the tree, the inclusive value parameter represents the utility that an individual
receives by consuming an alternative choice in this level of the tree. The inclusive value parameters are
Table IV. Summary statistics for NCMS program participants
Sick subsample (n5 442) Non-Sick subsample (n5 3873)
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age Years 53.1 17.6 0 103 33.7 17.5 0 89
Male Dummy 0.446 0.498 0 1 0.521 0.500 0 1
Disability or ADL limitations Dummy 0.133 0.340 0 1 0.012 0.107 0 1
Emigrant Dummy 0.041 0.198 0 1 0.165 0.371 0 1
Head of household’s education Years 7.3 3.4 0 18 8.1 3.1 0 19
Food as a share of expenditures Percent 0.523 0.211 0.050 0.963 0.499 0.197 0.054 0.963
Other sick household members Dummy 0.486 0.500 0 1 0.207 0.405 0 1
Notes: ‘Sick’ is defined as having at least one condition that was treated on an inpatient basis in the previous year and/or reporting
one’s health to be ‘worse’ or ‘much worse’ than in the previous year. , , and  indicate that the differences in means are
statistically significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels using a t-test, respectively. Source: Authors’ survey data.
10The decision ‘Do not seek treatment in an NCMS facility’ results in a degenerate branch for the second nest in the model. When
estimating a model using RU2, the inclusive values are unidentifiable for the degenerate branch due to canceling in the
dissimilarity parameters. While RU1 can be used to identify one of the dissimilarity parameters, it should be normalized to 1 (see
Hensher et al., 2005).
11Approximately 9.8% of the sample that was treated at an inpatient facility was treated more than once. In the event that an
individual sought health care in more than one level of health care facility, we considered only the hospital at the highest
administrative level. For example, if an individual received care in both township and county level hospitals, we considered the
individual to have sought care at a county level hospital.
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the main differentiation between two types of models used in nested logit estimation, the non-
normalized nested logit model, and the random utility maximization model. In the non-normalized
nested logit model, the inclusive value is defined as IVk ¼ ln
P
h2Dk expðRihjÞ, where Dk is the set of
alternatives in a choice level k and j describes the number of choices available in that limb. In the RUM
model, IVk ¼ ln
P
h2Dk expðRihj=lkÞ. In this case, utilities are comparable across levels since Rih is scaled
within each level by the dissimilarity parameter. Contrarily, without rescaling, utilities may only be
compared for alternatives within the same level.
We therefore use a RUM model in our analysis of a two-level nested logit model. We define K ¼
f0; 1g as indices for whether respondents seek care in an NCMS-eligible hospital, i.e. the limbs of the
tree. Hospital choice (H) reflects whether sick participants seek care in hospitals at the township,
county, or prefectural/provincial level or whether no NCMS-eligible care is sought.12 We denote the
top-level alternative (the choice of K) as C1 and the bottom-level alternative (the choice of H) as C2. The
chosen alternative is that with the highest associated utility. Errors in the nested logit model are
assumed to follow the generalized extreme-value distribution to allow for correlation between
alternatives within the nest (Kotz and Nadarajah, 2000). The conditional distribution of the random
disturbances (ekh) may thus be written as:







Following Amemiya (1985), we can derive the probability of choosing a particular administrative
level, h, given the choice of seeking NCMS care, k, as:
PrðC2 ¼ jjC1 ¼ kÞ ¼
expðxkhbj=lkÞP
m2Rk expðxhmbm=lkÞ
There are two general normalization methods (Hensher et al., 2005), one of which normalizes the
scale parameters at the lowest level and one of which normalizes the scale parameters at the highest
level. The latter is consistent with the utility theory (Silberhorn et al., 2008), so our results use this
method. Estimates are performed using Stata.
The dependent variable is an indicator reflecting four categories of hospital choice (township, county,
prefecture/province, and none). The first-level alternative is estimated by seven case-specific explanatory
variables: age and gender of the sick individual; a dummy indicating disability or limitations in







Figure 1. Tree structure reflecting healthcare choice
12Six individuals who were sick and who had NCMS insurance sought treatment at hospitals that do not participate in the NCMS
program, e.g. military hospitals. These observations are included in the ‘no NCMS-eligible care’ group, although the results are
identical if two separate alternatives (‘no care’ and ‘treatment in other hospitals’) are identified separately. Results are
qualitatively the same if treatment in other hospitals stands alone in its own branch and if a three-level model is instead used.
We therefore choose to use the two-level model with two limbs and three branches for expositional simplicity.
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head of household’s education; the share of expenditures allocated to food consumption; a dummy
indicating whether the household includes other members who are also sick; a dummy for whether non-
chronic conditions are eligible for reimbursement under the NCMS program; and a dummy indicating
whether outpatient treatment is covered by the program. Age, sex, disabilities, and emigration status are
individual-level descriptors that likely influence both the decision to seek care and hospital choice. For
example, Gao and Yao (2006) show that women are more likely to seek care than men. Similarly,
Reinhardt (2000) shows that age and disability positively influence both health care consumption and
total spending thereon. By contrast, people who emigrate have better self-reported health status
(Hesketh et al., 2008). The education level of the household head proxies for knowledge of health, as
education has been shown to positively correlate with health care utilization (e.g. Ichoku and
Leibbrandt, 2003; Lindelow, 2004). The share of household expenditures allocated to food is included to
proxy for household budget constraints14 as, for example, Makinen et al. (2000) show that relative
income influences both the decision to seek care and the type of care sought. Next, resource-constrained
households with multiple sick members face decisions regarding which household member to treat
through inpatient care. Coverage of non-chronic conditions will likely increase demand for inpatient
services while coverage of outpatient services will likely decrease it.
Four alternative-specific variables model the second level of the tree. All models include the
deductible, the logged benefit ceiling, and the average daily expenditures of inpatient care (for which we
use both provincial and county averages). In some specifications, we also include a measure of average
travel costs to each type of hospital. Data pertaining to deductibles and ceilings are provided by NCMS
administrators, while those for average daily expenditures and travel costs are generated from the
household data. Each of these alternative-specific variables varies by the administrative level of hospital
chosen for treatment.15
Finally, to understand whether or not poor or elderly households are affected differently, we interact
the alternative-specific variables with indicator variables in some specifications. Specifically, to measure
whether poor households respond differently than non-poor households, we use a dummy indicating
that household income falls below the official poverty line of 680 RMB per capita. To measure whether
the elderly respond differently, we use the share of elderly in the household as the interaction term.
5. RESULTS
Results for the two-level nested logit model of health care choice are shown in Tables V and VI. The
results are separated into two nests based on the decision tree, with the top nest reflecting the decision to
seek health care from an NCMS-eligible provider and the bottom nest reflecting the choice of hospital.
Errors are clustered by county and p-values are shown.
Although the results in the top nest are subjected to aforementioned sample selection bias, they are
largely consistent across the two samples and with the literature. For example, similar to Reinhardt
(2000), we find that younger individuals are less likely to seek care. We do not find a significant effect for
13ADLs measured in the survey include walking, standing upright for extended periods, lifting heavy objects, bathing, toileting, and
dressing one’s self. These and other ADLs have been shown to reflect general health conditions (McDowell and Newell, 1996).
14See, for example, Ravallion (1993) for some caveats about this indicator. We also tried using the log of household expenditures
and the log and level of housing wealth as self-reported by the household. Although not reported here, the inclusion of these
variables yielded qualitatively similar results.
15We thank an anonymous referee for observing that such variables may be used to model the decision to seek health care in a
traditional selection model. However, because these variables vary by hospital choice, they belong at the alternative-specific level
in the nested logit model, as explained by Hensher et al. (2005): ‘We should always place the attributes that are unique in a level
for an elemental alternative [i.e. hospital type] with the elemental alternative and not with the composite alternative [i.e. the
decision to seek health care].’ As noted above, however, because the nested logit model does not imply any temporal ordering of
choices, the alternative-specific variables also influence the decision to seek health care.
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gender, a result that is consistent with Yip et al. (1998). Next, having a disability or limitations in ADLs
positively impacts the probability that health care is sought at the 99% confidence level. Finally, the sign
on the emigrant dummy follows our a priori assumption that emigrants are less likely to seek NCMS
care given limited coverage outside the county, although the p-value on this coefficient is approximately
0.15 in Table V and between 0.21 and 0.45 in Table VI.16
Table V. Determinants of health-seeking behavior and hospital choice, estimated with nested logit model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Case specific variables
Age 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age-squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 1.40 1.41 1.40 1.40 1.38
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.22)
Disability or ADL limitations 2.86 2.77 2.86 2.84 2.83
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Emigrant 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.47
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
Head of household’s education 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98
(0.34) (0.30) (0.34) (0.32) (0.41)
Food as a share of expenditures 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.28 0.31
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Other sick household members 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-chronic conditions covered 0.99 1.10 1.00 0.99 1.01
(0.98) (0.68) (1.00) (0.95) (0.98)
Outpatient services covered 0.75 0.66 0.73 0.75 0.72
(0.30) (0.16) (0.19) (0.30) (0.18)
Alternative-specific variables
Reimbursement deductible (in thousands) 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.52 0.54
(0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.15)
Log of reimbursement ceiling 1.46 1.41 1.47 1.48 1.42
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average daily health expenditures
on inpatient care (in hundreds) 0.61 0.88 0.64 0.58 0.77
(0.05) (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) (0.34)
Average travel cost (in hundreds) 0.97 0.99 0.97
(0.80) (0.96) (0.77)
Interaction with deductible 0.01 0.62
(0.34) (0.83)
Interaction with ceiling 0.89 2.04
(0.70) (0.08)
Interaction with average expenditures 2.14 0.17
(0.25) (0.16)
Interaction with travel cost 0.83 0.56
(0.37) (0.41)
Type of Expenditures Province County Province Province Province
Interaction Term Poverty Elderly
Number of Obs. 446 446 446 446 446
Notes: Coefficients are reported as odds-ratios and p-values are shown in parentheses. Columns (1) and (3)–(5) use average
provincial expenditures as the health expenditures variable and column (2) uses average county expenditures. In column (4),
interactions are with an indicator variable that household income was below the official poverty line. In column (5), interactions
are with a variable measuring the share of the elderly in the household.
16Inasmuch as the sick are less likely to migrate for work, this variable may be subject to simultaneity bias. As such, the effect
would be difficult to interpret even if the point estimate was statistically significant.
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Household-level case-specific variables are also reasonably consistent with the expectations. First, we
do not find that the household head’s education level has a significant relationship with health-seeking
behavior, consistent with Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) but not Lindelow (2004). Perhaps not
surprisingly, the share of expenditures allocated to food has a negative and significant relationship with
the decision to seek in-patient care, consistent with the findings of Makinen et al. (2000). Clearly, as more
of the budget is allocated to food, less money is available to spend on hospitalization, with or without the
NCMS. The presence of another sick household member also reduces the odds that an individual seeks
health care. Finally, although the coverage of outpatient services has an interesting negative odds ratio,
neither that nor coverage of non-chronic conditions is significant even at the 10 percent level.
Table VI. Determinants of health-seeking behavior and hospital choice using the nested logit model, restricted
sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Case specific variables
Age 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.92
(0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.04)
Age-squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.10)
Male 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.37
(0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.32)
Disability or ADL limitations 5.10 5.16 5.05 5.19
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Emigrant 0.51 0.48 0.40 0.48
(0.45) (0.40) (0.21) (0.38)
Head of household’s education 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.93
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09)
Food as a share of expenditures 0.48 0.44 0.38 0.44
(0.26) (0.21) (0.12) (0.25)
Other sick household members 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Non-chronic conditions covered 0.98 0.99 0.94 1.00
(0.95) (0.97) (0.87) (1.00)
Outpatient services covered 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.61
(0.16) (0.24) (0.29) (0.24)
Alternative-specific variables
Reimbursement deductible (in thousands) 0.01 o0.01 0.01 0.0024
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log of reimbursement ceiling 1.30 1.29 1.37 1.28
(0.23) (0.26) (0.17) (0.33)
Average daily health expenditures
on inpatient care (in hundreds) 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.25
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04)
Average travel cost (in hundreds) 1.19 1.27 1.23
(0.28) (0.14) (0.32)
Interaction with deductible 0.01 357.27
(0.39) (0.11)
Interaction with ceiling 0.49 1.18
(0.53) (0.89)
Interaction with average expenditures 13.95 0.51
(0.33) (0.84)
Interaction with travel cost 0.21 0.75
(0.15) (0.84)
Interaction term Poverty Elderly
Number of obs. 366 366 366 366
Notes: Coefficients are reported as odds-ratios and p-values are shown in parentheses. All columns use provincial average
expenditures as the expenditures variable. In column (3), interactions are with an indicator variable that household income was
below the official poverty line. In column (4), interactions are with a variable measuring the share of the elderly in the household.
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The results in the bottom nest are perhaps more interesting for policy as they determine where people
seek health care conditional on seeking treatment. We find that the deductible has a consistently
negative effect. Thus, as the deductible for hospitals at a given administrative level increases, individuals
shy away from seeking health care in those facilities. The logged reimbursement ceiling has an odds
ratio of between 1.28 and 1.48, significant in Table V, but not in Table VI, implying that as the ceiling
increases for hospitals of a given type, individuals are more likely to seek care in those hospitals. Third,
we estimate an odds ratio below one on daily expenditure on inpatient care, whether it is measured as
the provincial average or the county average. Thus, as hospitals at a given administrative level become
more expensive in relative terms, people seek other sources of health care. Finally, we find that the travel
cost has a slightly negative effect in Table V and a positive effect in Table VI, but neither coefficient is
precisely estimated (it remains in the model as a control variable). By and large, these findings
demonstrate that individuals seek to minimize health expenditures in health-seeking behavior.
We further interact the four alternative-specific variables with a poverty indicator (Table V, column 4
and Table VI, column 3) and the share of elderly in the household (Table V, column 5 and Table VI,
column 4). Given the limited number of degrees of freedom in this estimator, it is not surprising that
noise increases as we add regressors. Thus, although many of the point estimates on these interactions
are not statistically significant, they still suggest interesting differences in the calculus of poor and
elderly households in deciding where to seek care. For example, the poor are less likely than the non-
poor to respond to differences in expected expenditures, suggesting perhaps that they forego care until
their conditions become severe enough to require treatment in expensive facilities. The elderly, on the
other hand, appear to be less likely to respond to differences in average expenditures. Instead, they seem
more likely to respond to the ceiling: households with a larger share of elderly residents are significantly
more likely than others to use hospitals with higher reimbursement ceilings. This result is not
unexpected if the elderly have illnesses that are more costly to treat.
5.1. Post-estimation analysis
Using the estimates presented in column 1 of Table V, Figure 2 displays the predicted probability of
choosing each outcome holding all variables constant at their means. The predicted probability
of foregoing hospital care altogether is 71.3%. Conditional on seeking treatment, the probability of
choosing a township hospital is 38.9%, the probability of choosing a county hospital is 34.2%, and the
probability of choosing a prefectural/provincial hospital is 26.9%.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between age and the predicted probabilities of selecting each type of

























Figure 2. Predicted probability of each hospital choice
P. H. BROWN AND C. THEOHARIDESS58
Copyright r 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 18: S47–S64 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
variables reflect their empirical distributions. The figure clearly demonstrates that the probability of
selecting health care of any type falls as age rises. Indeed, the probability of seeking health care falls
below 50% after age 45 and drops below 10% around age 70. Likewise, Figure 4 illustrates the changes
in the predicted probabilities of seeking health care in each type of facility as the share of expenditures
allocated to food consumption varies: the predicted probability of seeking health care of any type falls
from 37 to 22% as the simulated value rises from 5 to 95%.
In Figure 5, the deductible is simulated as a share of the empirical level for each hospital type
by county, ranging from 25 to 200%. A 75% reduction in the minimum spending level eligible
for reimbursement causes the predicted probability of seeking inpatient treatment to rise by just
2.8 percentage points. A doubling of the minimum spending level reduces the probability of seeking
health care by 3.4 percentage points. Similarly, in Figure 6, predicted probabilities of choosing each type
of health care calculated as the reimbursement ceiling varies from 25 to 200% of the empirical value for


























Figure 3. Predicted probability of each hospital choice, by age. Notes: Each bar represents the predicted probability
of choosing each hospital type by age, where age is simulated in 5-year increments, beginning at age 10. Other


























Figure 4. Predicted probability of each hospital choice, by poverty level. Notes: Each bar represents the predicted
probability of choosing each hospital type by the share of total expenditures allocated to food, where the share is
simulated in 5 percentage point increments, beginning at 5%. Other variables remain at their empirical distributions
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probability of seeking inpatient treatment to decline by 4.2 percentage points, while doubling the
maximum benefit increases the probability of seeking health care by 6.3 percentage points.
Finally, we calculate price elasticities at the sample means for the two consistently significant hospital
choice variables (i.e. the deductible and the average provincial expenditures) by simulating price changes
at one level relative to the others (Table VII). In general, demand for inpatient care is fairly inelastic to
changes in the deductible, but it is quite elastic in responding to changes in average expenditures. This
effect is nonlinear, with the price elasticity varying by price level. For example, in response to a 10%

























Figure 5. Predicted probability of each hospital choice, by minimum spending level eligible for reimbursement.
Notes: Each bar represents the predicted probability of choosing each hospital type by the minimum spending level
eligible for reimbursement. The minimum spending level is simulated as a share of the existing level for each
hospital type in each county, increasing in 25 percentage point increments, beginning at 25% of the true levels. The

























Figure 6. Predicted probability of each hospital choice, by maximum total benefit. Notes: Each bar represents the
predicted probability of choosing each hospital type by the maximum total reimbursement. The maximum
reimbursement is simulated as a share of the existing level for each hospital type in each county, increasing in 25
percentage point increments, beginning at 25% of the true levels. The thick line represents the empirical maximum
total reimbursement. Other variables remain at their empirical distributions
17Although the maximum total benefit is defined in log form in the nested logit regression, it is linearized here to facilitate
comparison with the minimum spending level.
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demand for care at the prefectural level. As the corresponding cross-price elasticities are quite low, more
people would hypothetically forego care with such changes. From a policy perspective, lowering the
average expected expenditures for in-patient care would seem to increase the demand for health care.
6. DISCUSSION
NCMS participants who reveal themselves to be in deteriorating health tend to forego health care in an
NCMS-eligible facility. Given the high minimum spending levels for reimbursement and the low
maximum benefits available in some counties, the low incidence of seeking care in NCMS hospitals may
not be unexpected. Still, this low take-up rate yields questions about how well the current policy
structure achieves the goals of the NCMS. That is, with reimbursement rates topping out between 30
and 45% in some counties, coverage may be inadequate to induce rural people to seek care. Indeed,
Brown et al. (2009) show that out-of-pocket expenses exceed 50% of total expenditures for catastrophic
health costs of 25 000 RMB in over half of the counties included in their sample. Consistent with this
story, we find that households that allocate more of their consumption to food are less likely to seek
health care: a 5 percentage point simulated increase in this measure reduces the probability that a sick
individual obtains health care in NCMS hospitals by 1 percentage point. Perhaps as a result of these low
reimbursement rates and high out-of-pocket costs, many individuals treat illness through traditional
medicine, which accounts for as much as 40% of all health care delivered in China (WHO, 2004).
Both higher age and sickness among other household members reduce health-seeking behavior. One
possible explanation is that costs incurred by elderly and/or sick household members (e.g. over-the-
counter medicines) crowd out expenditures on hospitalization. A second possibility is that households
near subsistence consumption may allocate scarce resources according to each household member’s
expected productivity. That is, if some minimum threshold for health care spending must be met to
ensure survival, then if income is insufficient to meet the health care needs of all household members,
spreading resources equally across household members endangers the entire household. Under such
circumstances, discrimination against less productive household members may help the entire
household to survive. Since the elderly are likely to have the lowest expected value of future income,
they may consume less health care.18 A third possibility is that the elderly people willingly forego health
care consumption to facilitate greater investment in the health and human capital of other household
members. Such altruism, particularly for the benefit of children, is consistent with evidence provided by
Silverstein et al. (2007). Our survey data do not allow us to differentiate between these explanations,
leaving this topic an important issue for future survey research.
Table VII. Selected own-price and cross-price elasticities, nested logit model
Elasticities with respect toy
Deductible
Township County Prefecture
Township hospital 0.192 0.017 0.005
County hospital 0.012 0.233 0.007
Prefecture hospital 0.013 0.022 0.258
Average daily expenditures
Township hospital 1.043 0.092 0.029
County hospital 0.079 1.519 0.045
Prefecture hospital 0.124 0.218 2.520
Note: Elasticities are calculated using the coefficient estimates in column 3 of Table V.
18Dasgupta and Ray (1986) describe the phenomenon of optimal discrimination in the context of nutrition.
HEALTH-SEEKING BEHAVIOR AND HOSPITAL CHOICE S61
Copyright r 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 18: S47–S64 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
Next, conditional on seeking health care in an NCMS-eligible facility, patients generally choose
township hospitals: the predicted probability of being treated in a township hospital is 45% larger than
being treated in a prefectural/provincial hospital. Given that the rural Chinese widely perceive hospitals
at higher administrative levels to offer higher quality services (Eggleston et al., 2008), individuals may
prioritize price over quality in choosing facilities consistent with the empirical evidence provided by
Hotchkiss (1998). In fact, program administrators in some counties have encouraged this response by
setting lower minimum spending levels and/or higher maximum reimbursements in local facilities
(Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008). Such reimbursement policies may also be an attempt to encourage
individuals to seek care at lower-level facilities for minor health incidents rather than tying up resources
at higher-level hospitals. Alternatively, patients may choose township hospitals for convenience or
because of preference for local doctors. Again, this topic remains for future research.
Although the cross-sectional data employed in this analysis preclude a rigorous evaluation of how all
vulnerable groups fare under the NCMS program, our results suggest that the poor and elderly are less
likely to seek health care when sick despite having identical insurance to other rural people living in
their county. Inasmuch as the policy goals of the NCMS program are to reduce the effect of health
shocks for vulnerable people, its implementation and structure to date leave much to be desired.
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